Using supervisory loan-level data on corporate loans, we show that banks were more likely to grant forbearance measures to the riskiest group of borrowers when they face high levels of non-performing loans (NPLs). Dissecting this phenomenon further, we show that risky borrowers are more likely to get an increase in the overall limit or the maturity, a stop in amortisation, a significantly lower interest rate, or a roll-over of a loan product. As a second step, we look at the effectiveness of this practice where we show that borrowers who received forbearance measures are subsequently more likely to default. Our evidence also suggests negative impacts on the issuance of new loans as high shares of forbearance are negatively correlated with new lending to the same group of borrowers. JEL: G21, G28
Introduction
In the recent financial crisis, the banking sector was the trigger as well as one of the most affected sectors in many countries. Corporate defaults, a crash in house prices, and high unemployment threatened the health of banks' balance sheets. Under these circumstances, keeping a loan performing by preventing a risky borrower's default was in the interest of lender and borrower. Terms such as "evergreening", "zombie lending", or banks "gambling for resurrection" emerged in the economic literature to describe the practice of granting concessions to troubled borrowers. While economically useful in some circumstances, it can be used by banks to conceal potential losses. This can cause systemic risk, increase uncertainty about the quality of banks' assets, and undermine trust in the banking sector's solvency which calls for regulators to monitor and prevent the establishment of this practice.
Using loan-level data on corporate loans of all Irish banks, we study the determinants and the effectiveness of forbearance after the recent Global Financial Crisis and we provide evidence for several patterns of banks under stress. In our empirical setting, we distinguish between extensions in the overall credit limit or the maturity of the loan, a stop in amortisation, a decrease in the interest rate, and a roll-over of the loan product. Using a standard logit model saturated with various fixed effects, we find that the riskiest borrowers are more likely to be granted a forbearance measure if the lender is facing high levels of non-performing loans (NPLs) . For this, we offer an explanation through the regulatory framework as NPLs lead to potentially higher provisions and thereby lower capital, as well as higher risk weights compared to performing loans. When default is seen as a conscious decision of the bank and the firm, banks face an incentive not to flag loans as non-performing but to grant forbearance. As a second step, we look at the effectiveness of forbearance. We show that borrowers who receive forbearance are more likely to default compared to their peers within the same risk category. Finally, we present evidence that lending and forbearance might be treated as substitutes by banks. Within buckets of similar loans, we find that the share of forbearance is negatively related with the issuance of new credit.
These findings reveal several novelties. First, we argue that capitalisation is not the only determinant factor of forbearance for banks. As can be seen in recent stress tests (EBA, 2016b) , Irish institutions were sufficiently capitalised through a public bailout so that they are now well above regulatory requirements. However, NPLs are at levels far above the European average which poses a threat to capitalisation under just moderate economic stress (IMF, 2016) . Therefore, we argue that the quality of a lender's loan book must be considered when analysing the determinants of "zombie lending". Secondly, we exploit the quality of the loan level data available to measure forbearance techniques along more definitions than are common in the literature. The idea is that pressure in times of crises might create incentives for different types of forbearance other than subsidised lending through a lower interest rate. More specifically, we analyse whether banks extend credit limits or maturities, or grant measures such as a stop in amortisation or a roll-over of a loan product. The granular loan-level data also allows us to suggest that forbearance measures have not been effective for the banking system. Using a standard stress testing model in the form of a logit-hazard specification, we show that borrowers who received these measures are more likely to default subsequently. Finally, the evidence suggests that forbearance ties up banks' resources which might have been used for new lending.
We conclude our empirical analysis with a correlation analysis that reveals the negative relationship of forbearance and new lending.
We contribute to a strand of literature focused on forbearance techniques of banks which emerged in the last two decades. For Japan, Peek and Rosengren (2005) provide empirical evidence that troubled banks allocated credit to severely impaired borrowers to avoid the realisation of losses on their own balance sheets. Analysing the mechanism of forbearance during the country's "lost decade", Caballero et al. (2008) use the term "zombie lending" for credit to unprofitable firms at interest rates below market values. Besides the hazard for banks themselves, the authors show that this misallocation of credit towards otherwise insolvent borrowers had significant negative effects on the real economy. The presence of zombie firms was found to depress job creation, deter the entry of healthy firms, and to decrease employment and investment of healthy firms. Using the effects of capital injections for financial institutions, Giannetti and Simonov (2013) show that troubled banks that remained under-capitalized were more likely to engage in "evergreening" by maintaining relationships with weak borrowers. Using Chinese bank-level data, Zhang et al. (2016) show that increase in the NPLs ratio raises riskier lending, potentially causing further deterioration of the loan quality and financial system instability. For Europe, Homar et al. (2015) call for more empirical work regarding patterns of forbearance as an important factor in the slow recovery after the Global Financial Crisis. The authors show that weak banks, banks in a looser regulatory environment, and institutions located in countries suffering from relatively worse economic conditions are more likely to grant concessions to weak borrowers. Using the Italian credit registry, this is confirmed by Schivardi et al. (2017) who show that Italian banks with relatively low capital levels were less likely to cut credit to non-viable firms after the Global Financial Crisis. This credit misallocation led to an increase in the failure rate of healthy firms while it reduced the failure rate of non viable firms. Acharya et al. (2016) use the event of the announcement of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) to identify "zombie lending" patterns for European banks. Institutions which were not sufficiently recapitalised in the wake of the OMT announcement were more likely to extend loans to weak firms instead of their more creditworthy peers who would have been able to invest credit more profitably. This resulted in significant real effects, most notably a slow down of the economic recovery in the post-crisis period. Bonaccorsi di Patti and Kashyap (2017) add that banks themselves are able to recover significantly faster from large adverse shocks if they manage risky clients more aggressively and therefore reduce credit risk.
In Section 2, we explain the conceptual framework and offer an explanation as to why banks face an incentive to engage in forbearance within the current regulatory framework.
Section 3 introduces the data and lays out our analysis of the determinants of forbearance.
Section 4 elaborates on the effectiveness of the different forbearance measures in avoiding default, and Section 5 looks at possible correlations between forbearance and new lending.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Conceptual Framework

The Crisis and the Irish Case
Ireland experienced one of the worst banking crisis in the aftermath of the recent Global Financial Crisis. It originated from a devastating boom-bust cycle in the domestic property market which was financed through bank loans. While the economic growth in the years (Honohan, 2010) . Banks became highly exposed to the housing market through the extremely rapid credit expansion to home owners and property developers. As a consequence of the shift in international financial markets in 2007/2008, Irish banks faced difficulties to maintain funding while domestic investors pulled back from the property market. After prices declined sharply and construction activities collapsed, banks faced an unprecedented increase in non-performing loans. Finally, public funds had to be used in order to recapitalise the most significant credit institutions in Ireland (Lane, 2011) .
The banks' recovery was then shaped by two stylised facts: (i) a fast recapitalisation of banks due to the public bail-out but (ii) threatening levels of NPL ratios on their balance sheets. We show these two developments for Irish banks in Figure 1 . On the left side, we look at Tier 1 capital as an indicator of the health of an institution's balance sheet. 1 We can see that lately, the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets (Tier 1 Capital Ratio) has levelled off, well above the regulatory requirement of 8% and the European average of 14.1% which is due to the public bailouts in response to the crisis. 2 On the right side, we analyse the Texas Ratio in order to get a more informative measure of how close the bank 1 Tier 1 capital is composed of core capital, which consists primarily of common stock and disclosed reserves (or retained earnings), but may also include non-redeemable non-cumulative preferred stock. 2 Through the public bank bailouts, 99.9% of Allied Irish Banks and 15% of Bank of Ireland became state-owned. is to the constraints due to credit risk. The measure isdefined as:
Texas Ratio = Impaired Loans + Loans 90 days past due but not impaired Tangible Equity + Loan Loss Provisions .
We can see that this time series calls for concern. Ireland is suffering from high levels of impaired loans as a legacy from the GFC. Besides the decline in house prices and resulting wealth effects, unemployment and contractionary fiscal policy made it impossible for some borrowers to pay back their loans. Hence, NPL ratios rose to levels of approximately four times the European average driving the Texas Ratio to critical levels throughout our period of observation.
These high levels of the Texas Ratio suggest a threatening sensitivity to credit risk, which is confirmed by the latest stress tests such as the recent Financial Sector Assessment
Program of the International Monetary Fund or the stress tests by the European Banking
Authority (EBA (2016a); IMF (2016)). In Figure 2 , we use data from EBA (2016a) Credit Risk refers to: Impairment or (-) reversal of impairment on financial assets. Profit or (-) loss refers to: profit or (-) loss before tax from continuing operations before credit risk and market risk losses. Source: Author's calculations; Data: EBA (2016a) different scenarios. Figure 3 shows that the largest contributor to the negative outcome under the adverse scenario for Ireland is credit risk. 3 It is projected to decrease the Tier 1 capital ratio by 6 percent between 2015 and 2018.
Forbearance
The Banks' Incentives and Constraints
In the context of our research question it is important to understand how constraints and incentives of banks influence their credit supply to the economy. Banks maximise their profits while staying solvent and holding enough liquid assets to meet their obligations.
At the same time, they are subject to capital and liquidity regulation set out in the Basel II + III framework. This framework is based on risk weights, which consequently play a role in the banks' decisions.
Credit risk is evaluated under three different approaches: the Standardized Approach (SA), the Foundation -Internal Ratings Based (F-IRB) approach, and the Advanced -Internal Ratings Based approach (A-IRB). Irish banks chose the F-IRB approach for their commercial lending during the period of our investigation.
Let us consider the case of a commercial loan close to default (low rating) under the F-IRB approach. The bank has an incentive to prevent default because of the impact on its capital ratio. NPLs have a negative impact on capital now and in the future. First, a provisioning shortfall is deducted from Tier 1 capital in case of default. Provisions are made based on the historical expected loss in the first place and are reassessed in the case of default. Given that a bank provisioned too little, the shortfall is deducted from Tier 1 capital. 4 International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 9, in place from January 2018 on, addresses this problem and will lead to an earlier recognition of potential losses.
Second, a default leads to higher future provisions, since they are based on historical observed default rates. Next to the double impact on capital, risk weights increase due to the loan becoming non-performing. Risk weights increase as the rating decreases but the last step into default is a particularly large increase in risk weights. This cliff effect might lead to an accumulation of loans just before default. The discretion in determining the inputs of the IRB models aggravates the problem and is only held in check by banking supervisors.
Intuitively, banks have a strong incentive to prevent the above and adopt forbearance measures in order to support the borrower in difficulty. Nonetheless, one has to be aware of the fact that forbearance measures themselves also impact capital and risk weighted assets.
A maturity extension, an increase of the overall borrower limit mechanically increases risk weighted assets. Switching to non-amortising or reducing the interest rate is a more nuanced approach which leads to lower capital in the future and it is an important factor leading to higher risk weights in the behavioural internal ratings based models of banks.
Lastly, a roll-over can be seen as a maturity extension with regards to capital and risk weights.
Having laid out the motivation for using forbearance measures we will now focus on the alternative use of capital tied up in forborne loans. After all, the optimisation problem of a bank leads to the decision whether to employ capital based on various constraints. The question arises if capital is allocated to forborne loans at the expense of new lending.
New lending mechanically increases assets and the risk weights are assigned using an application probability of default model. Ultimately, the risk weights depend on the observed default rates of comparable loans. This explains, in the Irish case, why commercial lending has very high risk weights. As a consequence, new lending is not only a function of profitability but also of the risk weights so that capital is allocated accordingly.
One could argue that all of this only holds once the constraints become binding (low capital levels). According to this, high risk weighted capital ratios should allow the bank to focus on profitability and pay little attention to risk weights. This argument is reinforced by the nature of these measures, as the risk component is already accounted for. Nonetheless, the risk of a bank's loan portfolio changes over the economic cycle and seemingly prudent provisioning levels can turn out to be insufficient. This uncertainty around the risk taken into account casts doubt on the quality of loan books with already high NPL ratios. This is because a high NPL ratio hints at the fact that the rest of the book will on average be of a worse quality than a comparable book with a lower NPL ratio (see Table 1 ). A deterioration of the economic environment that this book is exposed to can potentially lead to a significant average downgrade. This would increase risk weighted assets and decrease capital.
A lack of transparency regarding the quality of the underlying loans can put into question the credibility of the reported capital ratios. The higher the NPL levels, the bigger the potential problem for the bank. Therefore, the Texas Ratio defined in Section 2.1 is a more informative measure of how close the bank is to the constraints due to credit risk.
Having established that banks have an incentive not to let a default occur and that the Texas Ratio is a better measure of how close a bank is to its constraints, we will now explain the different types of forbearance.
Types of Forbearance
We exploit the quality and granularity of the Irish loan level data to measure forbearance techniques along several definitions. The first, and maybe most intuitive, is to allow the borrower to only make interest payments. By implementing the so-called amortisation stop, instalments are paused so that the amount outstanding stays constant until further agreements or even maturity. Furthermore, a bank can grant two types of extensions.
First, an extension of the total limit by increasing the amount that can possibly be drawn down by the borrower which is especially common for overdrafts. Secondly, the loan's maturity can be extended by pushing back the due date of the loan. For loans with constant repayments, this can result in lower instalments and therefore a lighter financial burden for the company. In a similar manner, the bank can "roll-over" a loan. We observe this when one loan expires or is terminated and contemporaneously compensated for by a limit increase on other products of that same borrower. Finally, we follow Caballero et al. (2008) and look at subsidised lending via the interest rate. We extend this idea to account for the environment of decreasing interest rates for our sample period. Therefore, we analyse whether banks grant specific borrowers significantly greater interest rate decreases compared to their peers. We define an advantageous change in the interest rate if the decrease in a borrower's interest rate is greater than the decrease for the safest borrowers within the same sector, segment, and product type. 5
These measures are very heterogeneous. While a limit extension can be useful for any borrower, other measures such as an amortisation stops might be most necessary, but also most risky, when the borrower is in distress. For this, we split the borrowers in three risk categories: safe, average, and risky. 6 Figure 4 shows the frequency of the different treatments within each risk category. We find that the share of treated loans is the highest for the riskiest borrowers for every forbearance measure with up to 19% of risky loans receiving a Limit Extension.This goes against banks' risk aversion but is not controversial given that mostly borrowers in distress are in need of help. On the other hand, as described above, it might be in the lender's interest to preserve their capital and/or keep risk weights at lower levels by preventing default. In our empirical analysis, we will investigate whether this phenomenon is more prevalent for banks under stress. NPLs indicates an overall stressed loan portfolio. On the other hand, only 6.4% of loans weighted by outstanding balance are in the safe category. Comparing these shares by volume and number of loans, we can see that loans in the safe category are relatively smaller whereas defaulted loans are considerably larger on average. This difference is even more evident turning to the split by segment. We can see that the largest amount outstanding is towards the SME segment but the majority of loans are lend out to micro SMEs. Even more extreme, corporate lending makes up for 18.9% of outstanding balance but only 0.3% of loans. Finally, we look at different product types where term loans represent the largest share by volume as well as number of loans. Furthermore, we see a larger amount outstanding for this product type (120,000 e on average) which is only surpassed by the "Other" category with an average loan size of 265,000 e. The reason for this is that the latter category includes large loans to corporates, such as syndicated loans. Table 2 shows how many borrowers are affected by our different forbearance measure across the whole sample. 89,255 borrowers receive any kind of measure, with the most frequent being a limit extension, followed by an interest rate change. This means that more than a third of all borrowers in our sample were granted forbearance measures. This split by the individual measures confirm what we show in Figure 4 : limit extension is the most popular measure, followed by interest rate changes, term extensions, an amortisation stop and finally a rollover. As even the latter has been applied to 11,353 borrowers in our sample, we argue that none of the measures are negligible.
The Determinants of Forbearance
A caveat of this confidential data is that we do not obtain the firms' names. This has two consequences: first, we cannot enrich the data with balance sheet information in order to control for firm characteristics. Secondly, we cannot identify the same firm across banks.
While the data allows us to identify a borrower having several loan products within a bank, we cannot control for the fact that the firm might have a relationship to another bank. However, Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010) use the Italian credit registry to show that the ability of borrowers to compensate through substitution across banks appears to have been limited after Lehman's collapse.
Empirical Approach
In a first step, we want to estimate the probability of modification i for a given borrower j with the following logit model:
where X l,t contains the time varying characteristics per loan l: rating and ln(Outstanding Balance); T k,t corresponds to the time varying Texas Ratio of bank k. Finally, we include various fixed effects: loan age fixed effects control for the loan age structure of a loan, sector × time fixed effects attempt to control for the macroeconomic environment, bank × segment × product type fixed effects control for the variation between different loan products of different sizes at a given bank, and county fixed effects. As borrowers do not leave the sample once they received a treatment, we finally include a dummy whether any loan by the borrower was modified before t. Therefore, we also test if it is more likely for a loan to get forbearance if another measure has already been granted. Regarding the dependent variable, we start by testing the probability for receiving any of the five different forbearance measures: an extensions in the overall credit limit or the maturity of the loan, a stop in amortisation, a decrease in the interest rate, or a roll-over of the loan product. As a second step, we then test the specification for each measure individually in order to identify the driving patterns of our results.
Results
Overall Forbearance
In Table 3 , we run the regression of equation (1) which describes our logit model where the dependent variable is a dummy of whether any forbearance measure was granted within the next six months (t + 1). In column (1), we show the regression without fixed effects or interaction terms. We find that average and risky borrowers are more likely to receive a forbearance measure than the base category safe borrowers. Then, we gradually add variables in an attempt to explain this mechanism. Starting in column (2), we add the Texas Ratio as an indicator for banks' stress in the equation as we want to test whether a weak borrower who borrows from a stressed bank is more likely to get a forbearance measure. We find the interaction effect of the borrower's rating and the bank's Texas Ratio to be significantly positive which means that risky borrowers are even more likely to be granted a forbearance measure at high levels of bank stress. Considering that the Texas Ratio peaked at levels around 140%, the interaction effect outweighs the negative base effect easily. This result is robust throughout columns (2-6), where we gradually add the fixed effects described above. In column (7), we look at a dummy whether the loan has already been modified since our borrowers do not leave the sample once they received a treatment. We can see that loans that have already been treated are especially likely to receive another forbearance measure in the future.
In order to understand the difference in actual odds of receiving forbearance some calcula- tion is needed. Pertinent to our research question is a comparison between safe and risky loans issued by a bank with an average Texas Ratio of 105%. As we run a logit model we look at e β to get the odds-ratio. Summing up the coefficients of interest, we can say that at a Texas Ratio of 105%, the odds of a risky loan receiving forbearance is 28% higher than for a safe loan, ceteris paribus and using coefficients from column (7). If the loan already received another forbearance measure, the odds of receiving a further measure increases by 208%. More interestingly, we can also compare similar loans (in terms of risk) along the distribution of the Texas Ratio. As an extreme example, we compare the odds of receiving forbearance for a risky loan issued by a bank at times of a very low and very high values for this variable. We can see that at the 95th percentile (Texas Ratio of 134%), the odds of receiving forbearance for a risky loan is 3,068% higher than at the 5th percentile (Texas Ratio of 70%), ceteris paribus.
The calculation of actual probabilities is less straight forward but nonetheless informative. Figure 5 gives us a sense for the different predicted probabilities of receiving forbearance. Here, only the rating and Texas Ratio vary, all other values (e.g. segment, bank, ln(Outstanding Balance)) are at mean or mode. We are interested in the influence of the situation of the bank and the borrower on the predicted values. We can see that at the average Texas Ratio of 105%, the probability of a risky loan receiving forbearance is 5%
higher than for a safe loan and at an absolute value of about 52%. More interestingly, we
can make a statement about the influence of the banks situation on the probability of receiving forbearance. For a risky loan, the difference in predicted probability is about 60% between a bank with a Texas Ratio at the 95th percentile (134%) and a bank at the 5th percentile (Texas Ratio of 70%). Given the higher Texas Ratio a the borrower of a risky loan has a 70% probability of receiving any forbearance measure within the next six months. This finding is in line with the incentives for constrained banks to preserve high capital ratios and low risk weights by forbearing loans, outlined in Section 2.2.1.
One concern could be that at high Texas Ratios, banks have an additional incentive to safe the biggest borrowers as they are also concerned about the exposure at default. Although we already control for the loan size in our regression, we show another robustness test where we add an additional double interaction effect in Table 9 in the Appendix. We can see that the additional effect of the loan size at high Texas Ratios is very small and that our main result, the interaction of riskiness and the Texas Ratio, remains significantly positive.
Different Measures of Forbearance
In Table 4 , we look at the different forbearance measures individually so that the dependent variable is equal to one if a specific practice was granted within the following 6 months.
For policy makers, it is indispensable to know which measure exactly is used for this pattern of forbearance.
Roll-over
We start with a very widespread measure called "Roll-over". Thereby, an old significant loan disappears but the overall exposure of the bank towards the borrower does not change significantly. 7 This implies that limits on other products were increased or new products were issued to grant the borrower a higher credit limit. In column (1) we can see that this forbearance measure significantly contributes to the overall patterns we described above. This means that (1) a risky loan is more likely to be rolled-over than a safe loan and (2) loans are more likely to be granted a roll-over at a higher level of the bank's Texas Ratio.
Term Extension
This measure considers an increase in the maturity of a loan which means that the exposure of the bank to the borrower decreases at a slower pace. In column
(3), we can find that this pattern also corresponds to the overall pattern of forbearance so that risky borrowers of banks under stress are more likely to be granted a term extension than safe or average borrowers. Following Caballero et al. (2008) , we look at what is referred to as "zombie lending" in the literature -a risky borrower receives a loan at a lower interest rate than a safer borrower. As we conduct our analysis for a period of decreasing interest rates, we analyse the changes in the interest rate, i.e. if the risky borrower is granted a greater decrease in the interest rate than a safer peer. Given the very heterogeneous sample of borrowers, we build buckets of borrowers by their sector, segment, and product type. Within these buckets, riskier borrowers of stressed banks are most likely to receive a decrease in the interest rate as can be seen in column (4).
Change in the interest
Amortisation Stop
This measure indicates whether the borrower stops paying the principal part of the instalments, i.e. switching to an "interest only" loan. Thereby, the outstanding amount is kept constant while re-payments are delayed up to maturity. In column (2) we do not find the exact same pattern as described for the overall pattern.
Still, a risky loan from a bank with an average Texas Ratio of 105% is much more likely to receive an amortisation stop than a comparable average loan. Following the same calculations as above, given a bank with a Texas Ratio of 105% the odds are 137% higher for a risky loan to receive an amortisation stop than a safe loan. However, looking at the bank's situation, we see that the probability of receiving an amortisation stop decreases with increasing stress of the bank. The base coefficient for the Texas Ratio is −0.43. We add the interaction coefficient for a risky loan to it: 0.002 − 0.43 = −0.428. Repeating the comparison of low and high values of bank stress, we see that a risky loan at the 95th percentile of the Texas Ratio (134%) has 93% lower odds to receive forbearance than a risky loan of a bank with a Texas Ratio of 70% (5th percentile). Therefore, we can conclude that stressed banks tend to refrain from amortisation stop as a measure of forbearance compared to less stressed banks. This is intuitive considering the regulatory framework: the higher outstanding balance implies a higher exposure at default which leads to higher risk weighted assets. Nonetheless, we do find that loans with a higher outstanding balance are more likely to receive this measure, hinting at the fact that larger loans might be more in the spotlight of banks, given their higher impact on regulatory ratios.
Limit Extension Finally, we look at extensions in the limit of credit. In the framework of forbearance, stressed borrowers could be granted more credit overall, in some cases with the aim to enable them to pay back another loan product. Looking at column (5),
we can see that more stressed banks are less likely to grant an extension in the limit of credit which is contrary to the overall pattern we found in Section 3.3.1. The negative base coefficient of the Texas Ratio shows the lower probability of granting this measure with increasing bank stress. Even adding the positive interaction effects of risky loans, this effect is persistently negative. Again, this is intuitive from a regulatory point of view as a limit extension would increase the required risk weights resulting from the increased exposure at default. In addition, stressed banks seem to be "risk neutral" in a sense that risky loans are equally likely to receive more credit compared to safe loans. The base coefficient for risky loans is −0.973 which is outweighed by the positive interaction term for risky only at a Texas Ratio of 108%. For lower values of the Texas Ratio, the log-odds ratio turns negative, indicating a lower probability for a risky loan to receive a limit extension compared to a safe loan by a bank with low stress.
Sequencing of forbearance measures
Having established that there is a significant share of borrowers who received more than one forbearance measure, we complete this analysis by looking at sequences. We want to check if certain types of forbearance are typically applied first while others might be predominantly used as a "measure of last resort" after other measures might not have helped sufficiently. A simple descriptive analysis can be found in Table 5 . Among all borrowers who received more than one measure, we measure how many times each forbearance type has been applied as a first, second, or a third measure. We can see that there is no special pattern so that the frequency of the measures in each place of the sequence simply reflects the overall occurrence that can be found in Figure 4 . This means that Limit Extension is the most common followed by a change in the interest rate and an extension in maturity in each sequence.
Effectiveness of Forbearance
Empirical Approach
As a second step, we want to see whether banks are effective in decreasing the probability of default through the forbearance patterns we described above. Therefore, we estimate the probability of default for a given borrower with the following logit hazard model:
where P r(Def j,t ) is the probability of default of any loan held by borrower j in any period in the future, X l,t consists of the time varying characteristics of loan l: rating and ln(Outstanding Balance), and F j,t is a dummy for (any) forbearance measure for any loan held by borrower j within the last six months. Again, we include loan age, sector × time, bank × segment × product type, and county fixed effects.
Results
The results of this regression can be found in Table 6 . We first analyse if the granting of any forbearance measure is associated with a lower probability of default in the future. As the ratings are defined by the ex-ante probability of default, the increasing coefficients with riskiness are reassuring. However, even controlling for the rating, the dummy for any forbearance measure is positive. This means that within a certain rating, borrowers who received a forbearance measure within the last six months are more likely to default. In the same manner as before, we gradually add fixed effects and our results are robust to all specifications. In the last column, we add a dummy whether another forbearance measure had already been applied to any loan by this borrower. As the coefficient is again positive, we can conclude that loans are even more likely to default if more than one forbearance measure was granted.
In Figure 6 we show our result graphically. The plot shows the probability of default for risky borrowers who received a forbearance measure and those who did not receive a measure in time t. Within each group, we also show the probability of default depending on whether the loan has already received another measure before t while all other variables are kept at mean/mode. Comparing borrowers who did and who did not receive forbearance in t, we can see that the probability of default after t is significantly higher for borrowers who received forbearance. The highest probability of default can be shown for risky borrowers who received more than one measure. 8
Again, it is crucial for policy makers to know which measures of forbearance are associated with a higher probability of default. In Table 7 , we can see the coefficients of different measures on the subsequent probability of default. As before, we control for the loan risk category and saturate the regression with all fixed effects of Table 6 . We can see that all measures have the expected positive and significant coefficient. However, the size of the coefficient varies strongly. Borrowers who stop to amortise are thereby most likely to default after the forbearance measure was granted. This can result in large losses for banks as these borrowers stop redemptions before defaulting so that the banks' exposure at default does not decrease.
Correlation with new Lending
Existing literature shows that when stressed banks keep existing relationships with risky borrowers alive, they show significantly lower levels of new lending compared with their In Figure 7 , we analyse the seasonally adjusted quarterly new lending figures to Irish firms. While the banks were under stress due to their NPL levels, their new lending to the SME sector was subdued. To exclude the hypothesis that this is due to constrained credit demand after the Global Financial Crisis, we look at survey data about SME credit applications during that time. 9 The dotted and dashed lines in Figure 7 show the application and rejection rate for Irish SMEs over time. The application rate and thereby credit demand was high in 2012 and continuously dropped throughout the sample. The period of low new lending volumes coincides with high credit demand. This suggests that banks rejected new loan applications during that time. The dashed line confirms the high rejection rate for loan applications around the time of low new lending volumes. This lets us suggest that the decreased new lending volumes were driven by low supply. In our empirical analysis, we want to see if this is correlated with forbearance patterns which might tie up capital so that supply for new loans remains suppressed.
These stylised facts motivate us to test this correlation of forbearance and new lending 9 We obtain these data from the RedC Reports on SME lending provided by the Department of Finance of Ireland. As SMEs are by far the largest borrower group, we argue that it is representative to look at this group in order to get an overview of the lending market.
for Ireland. We calculate the share of forborne loan and new lending per predefined groups. We choose to set up buckets by bank, segment, and county because we suggest that lending decisions are made separately for these groups. We then conduct a simple OLS regression between share of forbearance in t − 1 and new lending in t. Again, we add several combinations of fixed effects to control for the macroeconomic environment (county × time) and variation between banks over time (bank × time). If the correlation is still negative, this might be an indication that forbearance and new lending are substitutes so that an increase in forbearance could lead to lower new lending.
In Table 8 , we see that there is indeed a negative correlation between forbearance and new lending in the same bucket. This means that the higher the share of forbearance within a certain segment and county by a specific bank, the lower the issuance of new loans.
In terms of magnitude, a 1% higher share of forborne loans is correlated with a 0.08% lower share of new lending as can be seen in our most conservative specification in column (4). We test the robustness of this result in two ways: first, we use contemporaneous new lending in column (5). As our unit of time is relatively large (six months) the decision to "substitute" new lending with forbearance could happen within the same time period.
Secondly, instead of using the share of new lending and forbearance, we use the natural logarithm of the absolute amount outstanding in column (6). However, for both robustness checks, results remain highly significant even in our most conservative specification. As we showed that forbearance is mainly granted to risky borrowers one could suggest that this comes as a trade off for new loans which might be potentially safer.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analysed lending patterns of stressed banks in the post-crisis period.
More specifically, our analysis presents five patterns: an extension in the credit limit and in maturity, a pause in amortisation, a comparably low interest rate, and a roll-over of a loan product. We find that risky borrowers are more likely to receive these measures when banks are facing high levels of NPLs. As a second step, we evaluate the effectiveness of this practice. Using a logit-hazard model, we find that borrowers who received forbearance were subsequently more likely to default than their peers within the same risk category.
While we do not think that the forbearance measure itself caused defaults, we argue that credit might have been misallocated to the weakest borrowers which were subsequently not "rescued" from default. In the last part of our empirical analysis, we show that banks with a high share of forborne loans issue less new loans. This could result in tighter financial conditions for new firms who might potentially be more productive.
Our analysis highlights the importance of the health of a bank's loan book. While banks can be well-capitalised on paper, they might be under pressure by high levels of nonperforming loans on their balance sheets. We suggest that banks have an incentive not to recognise loans as non-performing and offer an explanation through the current regulatory framework. This is crucial for policy makers as uncertainty about the real quality of the loan book, if widespread in the economy, can lead to systemic risk and undermine trust in the banking sector's solvency. (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Texas Ratio k −0.011 * * * −0.011 * * * 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.041 * * * (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Rating Average l : Texas Ratio k 0.003 * * * 0.003 * * * 0.004 * * * 0.006 * * * 0.006 * * * 0.005 * * * (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Rating Risky l : Texas Ratio k 0.009 * * * 0.009 * * * 0.010 * * * 0.013 * * * 0.013 * * * 0.013 * * * (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Forbearance Before j 1.125 * * * (0.005) 
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Description of variables
All of our forbearance measures are dummy variables that switch to 1 if the forbearance measure i has been applied in time t. In the following, we provide the exact definition for each measure.
Rollover
A loan is considered rolled over if for a given borrower one of its significant loans disappears from the sample (expired or concordantly ended) but the borrower limit does not decrease by more than half of the expired loan's amount. This implies that limits on other products were increased or new products issued to increase the borrower limit. A loan is considered significant if it makes up for at least half of the total borrower limit.
Change in interest rate
In essence, we use the definition of "zombie lending" by Caballero et al. (2008) which we extend to account for the environment of decreasing interest rates for the our sample period.
Therefore, we first calculate the percentage change in the interest rate per loan across time, ∆r l followed by the average change in the interest rate for buckets, ∆r b , by: Sector, Segment, Product Type, and Rating. Next, we take the deviation of an individual loan from its bucket mean, ∆r l,b = ∆r l − ∆r b . Finally, we define an advantageous change in the interest if this decrease in deviation from the bucket mean is larger than that of the lowest decile of the two best rating categories, ∆r l,b < ∆r l,b lowest decile of best rating categories.
Amortisation stop
We extract this information on the basis of the banks' reports whether a loan is amortising or not. Therefore, this dummy variable is 1 if a loan switches from amortising to non amortising and 0 otherwise.
Limit extension
This dummy variable is 1 if we observe an increase in the borrower's total limit (sum of all loans).
Term extension
This variable is defined by whether we see a positive change of the maturity of a loan product.
Overall forbearance dummy
The overall forbearance dummy switches to 1 if any loan of a borrower received any of the these forbearance measures in a given period. 
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